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PSYCHOLOGICAL MATERIALS IN THE LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY OF JEROME FRANK*
JULIUs PAULt
Introduction
American jurisprudence in the twentieth century has felt the impact
of many new approaches to the study of legal institutions and be-
havior. The positivistic "revolution" in American jurisprudence has
been a motley brew, consisting of such varied ingredients as the
legal positivism of Justice Holmes, the sociological jurisprudence of
Dean Pound, and the legal realism of the late Judge Jerome Frank
- together with all of the varied effects of pragmatism, functionalism,
instrumentalism, experimentalism, and the use of materials from the
fields of economics, sociology, anthropology, psychology, and the
social sciences generally.
Frank's Attack on the Law-as-Father
The publication of Jerome Frank's first book, Law and the Modern
Mind, in 1930, marked a new departure in the history of American
legal realism. While it was not the first attempt to use psychological
materials in the study of legal behavior, it was a pioneer effort to
smite the myth that legal certainty could be obtained through the use
of legal rules.
For Jerome Frank, the vital question was why lawyers, judges, and
the general public believe in (and rely on) the myth of certainty and
exactness in the legal rules? The answer to this dilemma is relatively
simple, if we can accept Frank's major thesis, viz., our childish ways
of thinking as evidenced in the craving (or what the psychoanalysts
*This article is based upon Chapter III of The Legal Realism of Jerome N.
lamnk: A Study of Fact-Skepticism and the Judicial Process, by the author,
published in 1959 by Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands.
tA.B., University of Minnesota, 1947; Ph.D., The Ohio State University,
1954. Associate Professor of Government, Southern Illinois University, Car-
bondale, Illinois.
Lawyers and judges must constantly act as psychologists or psychiatrists.
The lawyer in his office often serves as an amateur psychiatrist to his clients.
Our legal vocabulary shows that courts cope daily with such psychological
matters, as, for instance, "motive, .... intention," "malice," "mental cruelty,"
"delusions" and "undue influence." - JUDGE JEROME FRANK,
1. "Judicial Fact-Finding und Psychology," 59 Case and Cont. 22 (Jan.-Feb.
1954), p. 22. Printed initially in 14 Ohio St. L. J. 183 (1953), based upon re-
marks delivered before a meeting of a special committee on law and psychology
of the Association of American Law Schools, Columbia University, November
28, 1952.
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would call "wish-fulfillment") for a fixed, stable and immutable set
of mechanical legal rules. From the works of child psychologists,
especially jean Piaget, Frank fashioned an elaborate description of
this process of childish illusion and its counterpart in man's desire for
legal certainty.2
Although this explanation sounds simple, and may be unique inso-
far as modern American jurisprudence is concerned, the logic of his
argument left much to be desired. For why should we look to child-
hood? Why not examine our prenatal existence as vell? In my
opinion, most of Frank's assertions about the childhood basis of adult
illusion are not easily defended. Only if you accept the basic tenets
of Freudian psychology can such assertions be even superficially ac-
ceptable.
Why does Frank emphasize childhood? 3 Why not carefully
examine our social institutions? Or our social mores? Or even our
national literature? For Jerome Frank, the answer was again quite
simple: because modern psychologists like Jean Piaget4 have shown
2. 'We are on the trail of a stubborn illusion. Where better, then, to look
for clues than in the direction of childhood? For in children's problems, and
in children's modes of meeting their problems, are to be found the sources of
most of the confirmed illusions of later years." Frank, Law and the Modern
Mind. N. Y.: Brentano's, Inc., 1930, p. 13. Most writers on law would not
accept the last statement as proved truth without more evidence and less
reliance on psychological dogma. Cf. the following statement by a non-legal
writer: "Jerome Frank, in Law and the Modern Mind (Tudor, 1936), has
argued that those who seek to repudiate all authorities are often unable to
do so. There is a sense of security which an unquestioning dependence upon
authority brings with it, and a heightening of certain satisfactions. So in the
absence of trustworthy human authorities, fictitious authorities are invented,
taking the form of abstract principles, half-anthropomorphically conceived. By
this means Frank endeavors to explain the 'basic legal myth' of a system of
law that exists beyond the law of the statutes, which legislators are expected
to 'discover,' rather than 'create.' He might have extended his theory to account
for all conceptions of objective values. Although Frank's theory is of a specu-
lative nature that must inevitably be controversial, it is of great interest, and
well supported by knowledge of legal practice and legal theory." Charles L.
Stevenson, Ethics and Language. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1944, n.
8, p. 92.
3. Cf.: "The psychological function of law for the child is well analyzed
in Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind.... pp. 13-21. Frank deviates
from the above analysis in that he concludes that the law is a substitute for the
father, whereas it is maintained here that law becomes not a symbolic person
but the prohibitions of a symbolic person. As the child progresses through
school grades, he becomes acquainted with the Constitution and its framers.
Here, the part of the founding fathers is clear - they made the law. In
their position as defenders of the Constitution, the Supreme Court justices
have received analagous roles, roles made more complete by their age qualifi-
cations and their specific sphere of the highest law of the land . . ." Sebastian
de Grazia, The Political Community; A Study of Anomie. Chicago: Univ.
of Chicago Press, 1948, n. 15, pp. 203-4.
4. The major books by Jean Piaget that Frank uses the most frequently
are: The Llanguage and Thoughts of the Child. N. Y.: Harcourt, Brace, 1926;
Judgment and Reasoning in the Child. N. Y.: Harcourt, Brace, 1928; The
[Vol. I I
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us that this is where illusion begins, and if this is the case, then this
is the place to start hunting down Frank's so-called basic legal myth,
the illusion of exactitude and certitude in the law.
This psychological explanation was, in this writer's opinion, the
ignoratio elenchi of Jerome Frank's philosophy of law. The fallacy
of Frank's argument about the origins of the so-called basic legal
myth lies in the fact that he proves his point by resorting to the child-
ish illusion argument, which in turn served as proof of childish be-
havior-patterns, which, insofar as modern jurisprudence is concerned,
is not the point at issue. In short, the argument is circular.
The child's use of his father is pre-eminent in Frank's theory of
legal illusion, 5 for sooner or later the child will have to shake off the
bonds of father-authority, and then the search for a father-substitute
begins; the father-substitute the child later adopts is the Law.
The Law can easily be made to play an important part in the
attempted rediscovery of the father. For, functionally, the law
apparently resembles the Father-as-Judge.6
Jerome Frank believes that the consequences of such an illusion
have their effects on many additional areas of the law, e. g., the area
of judicial law-making. Here again, the basis of the myth that
Child's Conception of Causality. N. Y.: Harcourt, Brace, 1930. Other hooks
in the field of psychology that Frank refers to include Bernard Hart's Psychopa-
thology; Its Development and Its Place in Medicine. N. Y.: Macmillan,
1927; and The Psychology of Insanity. N. Y.: Macmillan, 1931; Eugenio
Rignano's The Psychology of Reasoning. N. Y.: Harcourt, Brace, 1923; and
William L. Northridge, Modern Theories of the Unconscious. London:
K. Paul, Trench, and Trubner, 1924. "... The 'child,' as described by Pia et,
is not a constant. Nor are all children identical; there are developirental periods
in the growth of children; for convenience, I have not here differentiated the
periods." Frank, Courts on Trial; Myth and Reality in American Justice.
Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1949, n. 15, p. 72. Even before Piaget
and Freud, the courts were aware of the effects of "unconscious" factors on
witnesses. See Frank's opinion in United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaugh-
nessy, 219 F. 2d 77, 81 (2nd Cir. 1955).
5. ". . . And so, in the childish appraisal of the parents, the mother tends
to become the embodiment of all that is protectively tender while the father
personifies all that is certain, secure, infallible, and embodies exact law-making,
law-pronouncing and law-enforcing. The child, in his struggle for existence,
makes vital use of his belief in an omniscient and omnipotent father, a father
who lays down infallible rules of conduct." Frank, Law and the Mlodcrn Mind,
p. 15.
6. Ibid., p. 19. Frank does not regard this explanation of the legal myth
of rule certainty as anything other than a partial explanation. "This book,
then, from now on, reads as if unconscious 'father-substitution' were the expla-
nation of the oddities it discusses. But, we repeat, we are consciously using a
partial explanation. It is employed to further the chief aim of this book: the
development of that 'realistic' movement in law which seeks to overcome an
astonishingly prevalent blindness to legal realities." Ibid., p. 21, note. Of
course, what Frank regards as legal "realities" are for other writers in the
field of American legal philosophy, sheer nonsense. For Morris Cohen, or
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judges do not make law is the childish illusion that certainty can
be achieved. Frank believes that this myth that judges cannot make
law nor have the power to change existing law is the direct outgrowth
of a deep personal need for believing that a stable (in effect, unalter-
able) legal world can provide exact legal predictability.7
To a, legal realist who regards actual specific past decisions and
guesses as to actual specific future decisions as the law, the illusion
that judges cannot and do not make law is outlandish, and is, of
course, vigorously denied. Thus, the judges, as well as the lawyers,
deceive the lay public about the nature of the judicial process. Again
the question of "why?" is raised, and Frank promptly comes forth
with his usual answer: childish thought-ways and the legal certainty
myth. s
Does the psychological argument really prove that law is a father-
substitute, or further, that law is worshipped by Americans? If so,
why do we find so many evidences in America of attempts at avoiding
or evading the rigors of the law? Can this be explained psychologi-
cally as a symptom of the "split personality" of Americans in their
attitudes toward the law (analagous to those found by Myrdal in
The American Dilemma and in the Kinsey Reports), or perhaps as
a repudiation of their own real fathers? Or, are these evidences of
a lacc of respect or even contempt for the law (and sometimes the
lawmakers) merely exceptions to the thesis advanced by Frank in
Law and the Modern Mind? In the opinion of this writer, the psycho-
logical explanation begs far more than it can explain.
Frank's "War of Liberation"
With the lawyer, the judge, and the lay public all deceived, this
leaves only the wise student of legal reality (e. g., Frank) able to
break through the "sound barrier" of legal illusion and muddled
thinking. "Frank's war is a war of liberation." With the psycholo-
gist on his right, and the court room on his left, the left-wing legal
realist is thus able to see clearly what the law "actually" does. But
without Frank's "partial explanation" of childish thinking and its
7. Ibid., p. 35.
8. ". . . The no judge-made law doctrine, it seems, is not, fundamentally,
a response to practical needs. It appears rather to be due to a hunger and a
craving for a non-existent and unattainable legal finality - which, in turn,
may be ascribed to a concealed but potent striving to recapture in the lawl
the child's conception of the fatherly attributes." Ibid., p. 36.
9. "... The law must be liberated from the enslaving forces engendered
by faith in the 'Basic Myth' because harmful consequences stem from the
illusion or dogma of legal certainty. . . ." Harold G. Reuschlein, Jurispru-
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implication, no analysis of this kind could be made. For Frank, any
belief in mechanical certainty was intolerable. ". . . To say of a man's
thinking that it is scholastic or platonistic, is to say that it is tinged
with childish emotions."' 0
Since the scientific mind, according to Frank, is the adult and
emotionally mature mind, what the modern legal order needs is more
adult minds and less childish thinking. This brings us to the core
of Frank's solution of the basic legal myth in Law and the Modern
Mlind, namely, what he calls "the modem mind," a mind free of
father-authority and childish ways of thinking." It is, as Dr. Harry
Overstreet has said, the mature mind.
To be completely free of dogma, the mature, scientific mind must
be constantly open to change, and must continually reassess its axioms
and postulates. The essence of this self-labelled pragmatic outlook
is skepticism. But while the skeptical outlodk is a necessary tool,
the psychological basis of Frank's writing demands a more detailed
examination and assessment than is discussed in this article.
Jerome Frank was in the avant-garde of the psychological move-
ment within the school of American legal realism. Whereas Harold
Lasswell used the free phantasy method, Frank chose Piaget and his
ideas on child psychology. Many cogent questions have been asked
of Frank in respect to his psychological analysis of law, and perhaps
some of the criticisms and comments on the use of psychology in
modern jurisprudential literature ought now to be more closely
examined.
The Use of Psychology in the Study of Legal Behazior
Even though Jerome Frank has persisted in announcing that his
use of child psychology was but "a partial explanation" of the so-
called basic legal myth, some distinctions ought to be made at the
outset between the use of psychological techniques and psychiatric
treatment (which Harold Lasswell has, on a number of occasions,
suggested and which Frank mentions only sparingly). For example,
in writing about the frictions in government departments (Frank was
a commissioner and later chairman of the Securities and Exchange
Commission), Frank wrote:
10. Frank, Law and the Modern Mind, p. 75. Cf.: "Apparently Frank re-
gards any jurist as 'classical' who does not accept the gospel according to
St. Jerome." George W. Paton, A Text-Book of Jurispriidence, rev. ed., 1951,
n. 50, p. 19. Paton underestimates Frank's use of sophisticated swear-words.
11. Cf., "The Role of the Fatherhood Symbolism" in Joseph Rosenfarb,
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. ..My experience in government leads me to believe that
a very considerable part of the friction between government de-
partments, if one peered behind the rationalizations, could be
traced to personality difficulties of one or more of the disputants.
Under severe pressure, the best of men at times become the
creatures of inner drives and obsessions of which they have no
awareness. An occasional chat by an overworked official with a
government psychiatrist would make government run more
smoothly. I do not suggest that psychiatry is or can be an exact
science. At best, it is but an art, still in its infancy or adoles-
cence . 12
This is therapy, not psychological theory, but nevertheless Frank
has his doubts about psychiatry, which he feels is still not a true
science.
If, according to Morris Cohen, psychology is but a "mushroom
science," where does that leave psychiatry (or psychotherapy), which
at least has an empirical medical foundation? At times, those who
use psychiatry in connection with law, even though they are profes-
sional psychiatrists, are equally unclear about its aims.'
3
Karl Llewellyn, one of the more careful and moderate legal realists,
says that we cannot deny the existence of the behavioral aspects in
the relations between law and society."'4 "Behavior," in the Llewellyn
12. "The Scientific Spirit and Economic Dogmatism," in Jerome Nathanson
(ed.), Science For Democracy; Papers From the Conferences on the Scientific
Spirit and Democratic Faith. N. Y.: King's Crown Press, 1946, p. 21. See
Courts on Trial, p. 250 and n. 7; and " 'Short of Sickness and Death': A Study
of Moral Responsibility in Legal Criticism," 26 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 545 (1951),
pp. 611-12.
13. E. 9., Dr. Ranyard West, a British psychiatrist who is highly respected
by Frank, but unmentioned in the writings of other legal realists, wrote:
"Equally, no 'debunking' of law or lawyers, no precarious 'psychoanalysis' with
a flourishing of Freudian terminology need disturb the well-grounded law or
the wise lawyer. The core of the very process that shows us all as irrational
human beings, we doctors who dodge the scientific issue in pursuit of the
possible as well as we lawyers who yearn for rules and guidance firmer than
either history or science can give us, has shown us a function for law to
fulfill so firm and clear as to give the legal profession the thrill of all
modern thrills." "The Importance of Modern Psychiatry to the Lawyer," 14
Ohio St. L. J. 136 (1953), p. 141. One might be tempted to cry, Hallelujah I
But where does this leave the innocent layman? Also, see his essay, "A
Psychological Theory of Law," chap. XXXVI in Paul Sayre (ed.), Interpre-
tations of Modern Legal Philosophies (1947), pp. 767-87; David Riesmn,
"Tensions, Optimism, and the Social Scientist," 13 Psychiatry 518 (1950) and
his article, "Some Observations on Law and Psychology," 19 U. Chli. L. Rev,
30 (1951); A. J. Levin, "Maine, McLennan, and Freud," 11 Psychiatry 177(1948).
14. "A Realistic jurisprudence - The Next Step," 30 Col. L. Rev. 431
(1930), p. 443. Llewellyn goes on to say that we should study judges' and
officials' behavior as judges and as officials, not as children, or as immature
adults. Official behavior as such is the core of his psychological technique.
While Llewellyn was quite scornful of Frank's use of the notion of father-
[Vol. 11
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sense, is what officials do, not their unconscious or subconscious
motives or explanations of their inner drives. In my opinion, this
is a far more realistic (and I might add, scientific and pragmatic) ap-
proach to the study of legal behavior than Frank has proposed be-
cause Llewellyn, as legal philosopher, has the necessary tools for an
evaluation of the kind of legal "behavior" he examines. In short,
Llewellyn does not venture into areas in which he is inexpert.
In the hands of experts, psychology and psychiatry can be of real
value to the lawyer, the judge, and the student of law.' 5 This, in
all fairness, I would not deny, but the problem is really one of wfho
uses these special tools and in what fashionfl6 When Jerome Hall,
the Gluecks or the late George H. Dession use psychological tech-
niques in criminology, or courts call on competent psychiatric experts
in the treatment of certain types of criminal behavior, this is a far
different and more expert use of psychological tools than was Jerome
Frank's exposure of the myth of legal certainty.' 7 In any case, pro-
fessional and amateur are trying to understand what they call "be-
havior" at the level of judicial action. There are many examples of
significant contributions of this kind.' 8
authority in Law and the Modern, Mind, he recognized that much of the book
was independent of that idea- See Frank, Courts on Trial, pp. 75-78, 159-61;
" 'Short of Sickness and Death': A Study of Moral Responsibility in Legal
Criticism," 26 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 545 (1951), pp. 609-10.
15. There are many good examples of co-operation between medical and
psychiatric personnel and lawyers that have resulted in legal reforms, new
state laws, or proposed model state laws for the future, e. g., State of Michigan,
Report of the Governor's Commission on the Deviated Sex Offender, Detroit,
Michigan, 1951; also, the report by Dean Roscoe L. Barrow of the Uni-
versity of Cincinnati College of Law and a joint committee of psychiatrists and
neurologists on the need for modernization and improvement of state laws con-
cerning the treatment of epileptics, Barrow and Fabing, Epilepsy and the Law
(N. Y.: Hoeber, 1956). Another area of fruitful exploration between the
lawyer and the psychiatrist, as well as the social worker, has been divorce law
reform. It seems to me that these inter-disciplinary efforts have been far
more valuable than the proposed psychoanalysis of individual judicial be-
havior.
16. Cf.: "Shall we not do more by a less rigidly behaviorist psychological
method, tempered by the consideration that we need to take account of the
restraints upon non-rational individual judicial behavior and that judges are
not likely to do better than we expect them to do. There was a psychological
efficacy in the nineteenth-century ideal." Pound, "Fifty Years of Jurisprudence,"
(IV - Realist Schools), 51 Harv. L. Rev. 777 (1938), p. 790. Pound says
that the legal realists do good work, but realism is not the whole story of
what law is and how it functions.
17. This is not to say that Frank as amateur psychologist has no right to
employ psychological tools of analysis, but that the findings of amateur and
professional alike should be clearly distinguished from each other.
18. See Manfred S. Guttmacher and Henry Weihofen, Psychiatry and the
Law. N. Y.: W. W. Norton, 1952, p. 11. This is an extremely useful text-
book on the various uses of psychiatry in trials, hearings, and legal procedure
in general. For critical comments on this book, see Alfred L. Gausewitz, "A
Lawyer Looks at Psychiatry and the Law," 3 Buffalo L. Rev. 25 (1953) and
1959]
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Professor Jerome Hall, in a penetrating article that discusses the
relations between law and psychiatry, says that
. . . psychiatry has much to offer in the improvement of the
law and its administration. The problem is to establish a sound
theoretical basis on which psychiatry and legal science can work
harmoniously together. That this is a difficult problem is witness-
ed by the current polemics. But that it is not insuperable should
be apparent if we view it as essentially a problem of inter-dis-
ciplinary knowledge. Considerable progress has been made in
some inter-disciplinary areas, biochemistry for example, and
very promising results have been attained in others, such as an-
thropology, institutional economics, and certain socio-legal stud-
ies. There is no extraordinary obstacle to similar progress in
interrelating psychiatry and law.' 9
Even the most confirmed critics of Jerome Frank's use of psycho-
logy can still see the value of some psychological techniques, as long
as the focus is on the overt and not the hidden behavior of judges and
juries.
Frederic Wertham, "A Psycbiatrist Looks at Psychiatry and the Law," 3
Buffalo L. Rev. 41 (1953). Aside from the numerous periodical writings of
the Gluecks, J. Hall, Sutherland, Davidson, and Dession, I would also recom-
mend these recent volumes: Winfred Overholser, The Psychiatrist and the
Law (N. Y.: Harcourt, Brace, 1953); Gregory Zilboorg, The Psycholoq.10
of the Criminal Act and Punishment (N. Y.: Harcourt, Brace, 1954) . John
Biggs, Jr., The Guilty Mind: Psychiatry land the Law of Homicide (N. Y.:
Harcourt, Brace, 1955); Paul H. Hoch and Joseph Zubin (eds.), Psychiatry
and the Law (N. Y.: Grune and Stratton, Inc., 1955); and the following
recent articles: George H. Dession, "The Technique of Public Order: Evolv-
ing Concepts of Criminal Law," 5 Buffalo L. Rev. 22 (1955) and "Psychiatry
and Public Policy," 5 id. 48 (1955), both of which were part of a memorial
volume devoted to the work of the late Professor Dession; Jerome Hall,
"Psychiatry and Criminal Responsibility," 65 Yale L. 1. 761 (1956); and Wil-
liam 0. Douglas, "The Durham Rule: A Meeting Ground For Lawyers and
Psychiatrists," 41 Iowa L. Rev. 485 (1956).
19. "Psychiatry and Criminal Responsibility," 65 Yale L. J. 761 (1956),
p. 763. After a long discussion of the M'Naghten and Durham Rules and a
suggested substitute for the former, Professor Hall concludes: "Still, dis-
agreement concerning legal and psychiatric definitions of insanity remains, and
until the issue is resolved, it is difficult to see how forensic psychiatry can
make important progress. That it cannot proceed upon the supposition that
the medical question and the legal question exist in separate compartments is
clear. Many clinical psychiatrists have not studied psychotic behavior in life
situations that are legally important, and have not formulated apt definitions to
express the pertinent knowledge; but this does not imply that knowledge is out-
side the realm of their competence or that it is peculiarly legal. To the extent
that they study abnormal conduct in social contexts they will contribute to the
kind of knowledge that is directly significant in both psychiatry and law. They
have emphasized the volitional and emotional phases of mental disease; they
should give more study to concomitant impairment of the cognitive functions,
The progress of forensic psychiatry depends upon a sound synthesis of existing
knowledge and an appreciation of legal values and methods." Id., p. 785.
[Vol. 11
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Roscoe Pound, like Karl Llewellyn, has a much more modest view
of the role that psychological analysis should play in studying the
behavior of judges. For Pound, it is the courts and the legal tradi-
tion that supports them that deserves psychological attention, not the
individual unconscious behavior of judges.20 Frank would answer
Pound by saying that this is much too modest a view of psychology.
Pound's view leaves out what Frank considers to be the crucial ele-
ment in the picture, namely, the hidden elenzents in the judge's actions.
Among the legal realists, the argument ranges far and wide over
this precise issue: what, if any, are the hidden or covert elements of
judicial behavior, and if there are such phenomena, how should stu-
dents of law proceed to examine them? Lasswell would use the
free-phantasy method and Frank the teachings of modern child psy-
chology; Oliphant, Schroeder and Malan, the findings of behavioristic
psychology.
Even if there is some common agreement on the fact that legal be-
havior should be studied with care, where does this take the argument
that psychology is the best or the most accurate tool for studying this
type of behavior? Again, I will turn to Ranyard West, who bases
his answer to this question on the huimanness of legal behavior. Dr.
West arguies that it is the potential criminal in every man that justi-
fies the use of psychology.2 1 Why not be more direct and say that
it is the very fact that -man is man and that his behavior is human
behavior (whether we choose to call it "rational" or "irrational," or
a mixture of both, or neither) that makes legal activity conducive to
psychological explanation? One of Jerome Frank's strongest sup-
porters had this to say about Frank's use of psychology in Law and
the Modern Mind:
. . . The psychology of this book must be regarded as a weapon
of attack upon a cumbersome set of judicial inhibitions, not an
instrument of precision .... 22
20. Pound, "Fifty Years of Jurisprudence," (IV - Realist Schools), 51
Harv. L. Rev. 777 (1938), p. 789. The fact that overt legal behavior is more
prone to study does not necessarily mean that the "hidden" cleinents in the
judicial process should be ignored. The fact that we are unable at this stage
of legal knowledge to study the unconscious factors of legal behavior with any
degree of accuracy or precision does not mean that these factors are ron-
existent, but it does place a heavy responsibility on the observer, a responsibility,
in this author's view, that some of the legal realists have not clearly under-
stood. See Felix Frankfurter, "Mr. Justice Holmes and the Constitution," 41
Harv. L. Rev. 121, 132-33 ns. 33-34 (1927), and Mr. Justice Frankfurter's con-
curring opinion in Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak, 343 U. S. 451,
466-67 (1951).
21. Conscience and Society; A Study of the Psychological Prerequisites of
Law and Order. N. Y.: Emerson Books, 1945, p. 165.
22. Thurman W. Arnold, Book Review of Law and the Modern Mind, "Law
9
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Yet, if Thurman Arnold is correct in saying that Frank is using a
"weapon of attack," how can we judge its accuracy, validity, or
even its effectiveness, if it is not a precise instrument of analysis? Is
it the "attack" that counts the most, the debunking of the basic legal
myth, that counts more than the evidence presented ?23 If, as Frank
said in so much of his writing, jurisprudence must be scientifically
sound and pragmatic to the best of its ability, how can Arnold's
explanation be justified? Although Law and te Modern Mind was
a classic in the history of American legal realism, even as confirmed
a legal realist as Karl Llewellyn could not swallow whole-hog the
tenets of psychoanalysis, the fetish, the father-image, and the hallowed
free-phantasy technique.
Other writers, e. g., Pound, Morris Cohen, Fuller and Gurvitch,
were equally appalled at the failure of the psychological results to
prove their assertions and to keep a sense of balance once they
emerged from their sacred couch. Pound was gracious enough to
accept the good works of the psychological realists in spite of their
careless use of psychological dogma, but Cohen was not nearly so
kindly in his criticism of Frank. In a rather harsh attack on the
use of psychoanalytical tools (e. g., the Law as a father-substitute),
Cohen argued that the age-old myth of a completely certain legal
system "cannot be overthrown by an admitted fiction from the mush-
room science of psychoanalysis ... "2
and Men," 7 Sat. Rev,. of Lit. 644 (March 7, 1931), p. 644. Arnold also says
that the book is intelligible to the layman, a view that I cannot accept.
23. Cf,: "Mr. Frank, however, has no clear idea as to what he is thus
committing himself to; and elsewhere, especially in the footnotes, he explicitly
recognizes the existence and need of some rules and certainty in the law. This
admission, however, still leaves his fundamental thesis rather vague and incon-
sequential, and his polemics pointless, if not unfair. For obviously, if the law
contains both rules and discretion, both certainty and uncertainty, the significafit
issue is precisely the one that Dean Pound faces and that Mr. Frank dodges,
viz., where to draw the line between legal rule and judicial discretion.
... There can be no doubt that the desire for complete certainty - the crav-
ing for absolute truth - is a trait of all creatures born of woman. . . ." Morris
R. Cohen, "Jerome Frank," in Law and the Social Order, N. Y.: Harcourt,
Brace and Co., 1933, pp. 359, 360.
24. Ibid., p. 361. One should, however, take note of Frank's fourteen other
possible explanations of the basic legal myth in app. I of Law and the Modern
Mind, p. 263, as well as his later criticism of Freud in Save America First,
pp. 198-201 and Fate and Freedom, pp. 64-69, 351-52. See Albert Ellis, "An
Introduction to the Principles of Scientific Psychoanalysis," 41 Genetic Psychol-
ogy Monographs 149 (1950), and Harold D. Lasswell, "Impact of Psychoana-
lvtic Thinking on the Social Sciences," in Leonard D. White (ed.), The State
of the Social Sciences (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1956, pp. 84-115.)
Also, Percival Bailey, "The Great Psychiatric Revolution," 113 Am. J. PsyeJia-
try 387 (1956) ; Hyman Smollar, "A Lawyer Looks at Psychiatry and the Law,"
editorial note in 17 Psychiatry 391 (1954) ; and "Witnesses and Testimony at
Trials and Hearings," 13 Journal of Social Issues, No. 2, 1957 (entire issue).
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PSYCHOLOGICAL MATERIALS
Dean Pound, who has borne the brunt of much of Frank's invective,
contended that the psychological realists were themselves not free
from another form of a priori dogmatism.2 5 For Georges Gurvitch,
the serious deficiency in the psychological approach to law is methodo-
logical;26 whereas Lon L. Fuller, who is considered one of the lead-
ing non-realists, finds at least a dubious value in philosophical exor-
cism. With his usual cutting philosophical tang, Professor Fuller
wrote:
The realist movement has done an immense service to American
legal science in inculcating in it a healthy fear of such very real
demons as Reified Abstractions, Omnibus Concepts, and Meta-
phors Masquerading as Facts.27
Even the late Felix S. Cohen, who was classified as a legal realist,
was a staunch critic of Frank and the psychological realists. His
book, Ethical Systems and Legal Ideals,28 clearly describes the role
and importance of values in relation to the legal order, for he was
always critical of those who felt that empirical analysis automatically
eliminated values from the realm of objective reality.
2 9
25. ". . . The new realists have their own preconceptions of what is signifi-
cant, and hence of what juristically must be. Most of them merely substitute
a psychological must for an ethical or political or historical must.
Nor is the psychological neo-realism of the moment wholly emancipated from
a priori dogmatism with which it reproaches older types of juristic thought
." Pound, "The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence," 44 Har'. L. Rev. 697
(1931), pp. 700, 706.
26. ". . Some turn toward a sociology of law based exclusively on reality
judgments and free from dependence on jurisprudence of which the sole task
is reduced to applying the results of reality judgments without any consideration
for ends and values (Llewellyn, Arnold). Others would eliminate jurispru-
dence in general, to replace it not by sociology, but by a naturalistic psychology
which describes the minds of lawyers (Robinson) or even by psychoanalysis of
lawyers (Frank) ....
... Here it suffices to note that no kind of individual psychology can
generally lead to a contact with the problems of law as phenomenon essentially
constituted by collective experience and linked to the social whole ... ." Sociol-
ogy of Law. N. Y.: Philosophical Library and Alliance Book Corp., 1942,
pp. 172, 175-76.
27. "American Legal Realism," 82 U. Pa. L. Rev. 429 (1934), p. 443. See
his The Law in Quest of Itself. Chicago: The Foundation Press, 1940.
28. An Essay on the Foundations of Legal Criticism. N. Y.: Falcon Press,
1933.
29. Cf.: "It is one of the serious dangers of the functional approach that
those who invoke it for the purpose of description may without further thought
utilise it as a criterion of value. It is important for the jurist to remember
that when he has described the human significance of a rule he has not thereby
justified its existence." F. S. Cohen, 1 Mod. L. Rev. 5 (1937), pp. 24-5. Also,
see his excellent article, "Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Ap-
proach," 35 Col. L. Rev. 809 (1935), repr. in 2 Etc.: A Rev. of Gen. Semantics
82 (winter 1944-45). For a penetrating analysis of the problems encountered
in studying values, see Arnold M. Rose, "Sociology and the Study of Values,"
7 British Journal of Sociology 1 (1956).
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SoUTH CAOLuNA LAW QUARTERLY
In spite of the fact that Jerome Frank on many occasions, both
in his speeches and his writings, strongly denied an addiction to the
psychological approach to the study of legal behavior, 30 many im-
portant questions still justified examination, and among those ques-
tions that still lurked in the minds of some legal writers were the
following:
1. Can adult behavior always be traced to childhood behavior?
2. What do we mean by legal behavior, and how do we analyze it?
3. What is meant by the "unconscious" behavior of judges and
juries?
4. Do all children have the same degree of father-worship?
5. Do all men look for a father-substitute after childhood ends
and adulthood begins?
6. Is Law always the father-substitute that men choose in adult
life?
7. Are words always used "magically" with the intent to deceive
others?
8. Are the legal rules that men follow and respect part of their
legal behavior?
9. Is the search for security and stability, and especially legal
certainty, always childish?
10. Is self-awareness in judges really a panacea, for what happens
to the biases and value judgments that still remain in their
personality?
Conclusions
The unexpected death of Judge Frank ended over a quarter of a
century of fruitful contributions to the study of government, law,
and the broad interrelationships between law and the social sciences.
He was, as Professor Fred Rodell once wrote,3 ' the twentieth century
counterpart of the "compleat man." His mind was unparochial and
omnivorous in its appetite for the broadest possible comprehension
of legal problems and their possible solutions.
30. Frank expressed grave doubts about the excessive and at times reckless
use of psychological materials by other writers and consistently qualified his
own use of psychological theory. See his extremely critical bool, review of
F. R. Bienenfeld's Rediscovery of Justice, 38 Calif. L. Rev. 351 (1950), and
his contribution to "The Lawyer's Role in Modern Society: A Round Table,"
4 J. Pub. L. 8 (1955), pp. 23-24.
31. "For Judge Frank, in the breadth and scope of his curiosity and knowl-
edge, comes about as close as anyone I know to being the modern counterpart
of the fabulous 'compleat man' of medieval and earlier times. His book
abounds with eclectic references to anthropology, psychology, philosophy, litera-
ture, mathematics, physics, even music, and with casual quotations from pundits,
past and present, in these and other fields of learning. So familiar is the
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PSYCHOLOOICAL VMATERIALS
Although desirous of cutting across the artificial boundaries be-
tween law and the social sciences ("arts" for him), Judge Frank
always recognized the necessity for refinement of the techniques of
psychoanalysis and psychiatry. This is dearly evidenced in the fact
that many of the assertions of Law and the Modern Mind were con-
siderably altered and revised in his later writings.
Irrespective of how well-accepted his ideas on the law may be,
Jerome Frank's writing always produced an immediate flow of critical
discussion in the law journals. In his pioneer use of psychological
tools of analysis, Frank was a crusading legal realist, ready and
willing to take on all of his critics with vigor and a good sense of
humor. His contribution as the country's leading provocateur in
the study of legal problems is immeasurable.
Whatever categories we employ, or definitions of jurisprudence we
agree upon, Jerome Frank's ideas on the law are an important seg-
ment of modern American legal thinking. Regardless of their ac-
ceptance or rejection, they deserve to be regarded as an integral part
of American jurisprudence. For the creative iconoclast within juris-
prudence has an important role to play and ought, in all fairness, to
be given a place in the long and varied history of the sources, nature,
and ends of law that we call jurisprudence.
3 2
Judge with all this stuff, and with his more legal material as well, that he
frequently forgets to footnote for sources the quotes and paraphrases he tosses
off in such profusion ... " Book Review of Courts on Trial, 25 Ind. L. 1. 114
(1949), p. 115.
32. For a more thorough discussion of the subject of this article, see Julius
Paul, "The Legal Thinking of Jerome Frank: A Study in Contemporary
American Legal Realism" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of
Political Science, The Ohio State University, 1954), "The Role of the Judge
in Jerome Frank's Philosophy of Law," 10 Okla. L. Rev. 143 (1947) and
"Jerome Frank's Attack on the 'Myth' of Legal Certainty," 36 Neb. L. Rev.
547 (1957), pp. 562-63: "Jerome Frank's Ideas on the Relation of Legal Edu-
cation to the Judicial Process," 9 J. Legal Ed. 177 (1956), pp. 180-82.
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